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Pilar? Having studied at Princeton with
Hemingway biographer Carlos Baker,
Mort provides one of the most convincing explanations yet offered for Hemingway’s decision to place himself in
harm’s way.
It would be easy simply to ascribe Hemingway’s decision to that of a writer living out the life that he had illustrated in
his art. Mort takes a more scholarly approach, however. One of the most interesting elements of this book is its
description of the three stages through
which each of Hemingway’s characters
pass in his novels—the stage of innocence, then suffering, and finally an existential stage, in which the hero creates
meaning out of nothingness. It is certainly possible to see Hemingway himself following this trajectory. In the
imaginative mind of a writer, the
U-boat appeared as a multifaceted
menace, not only a threat to merchant
vessels but a stealthy craft that could
deliver spies to the many coves and inlets of Caribbean islands like Cuba.
Hunting down and attacking these
modern weapons of war would require
a dedicated band of ardent antifascists,
the likes of whom Hemingway had consorted with in Spain in the late thirties,
and whom he would lead into action
again, as his small fishing vessel sought
valiantly for the elusive U-boats
throughout the Caribbean and the Gulf
of Mexico. Many elements of Hemingway’s complex personality combined to
compel him to sail Pilar into action,
and Mort gives each of these factors due
treatment.
A former naval officer himself, Mort is
familiar with life at sea. The many accounts of Hemingway leading his crew
on these dangerous missions benefit
from Mort’s having participated in

patrols in some of the same waters. In
summing up this work, one phrase
stands above the rest as a testament to
the sweeping panorama of Mort’s ambitious attempt to tie together a great
naval campaign and the life of an
American literary giant: “It was action
and artistry combined. It was also fun,
most of the time, especially when there
was enough gin.” Mort has provided us
with a fascinating book, and students of
both military and literary history will
definitely want to put The Hemingway
Patrols on their reading list.
JEFF SHAW

Naval War College

Stoker, Donald. The Grand Design: Strategy and
the U.S. Civil War. New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2010. 498pp. $27.95

It is difficult to imagine historical
ground that has been more thoroughly
mined than that of the American Civil
War. Biographies, battle studies, sweeping histories, and all manner of specialized analyses dot the literary landscape.
However, rather than turning away
from a potentially saturated market,
our collective interest in this sanguinary
conflict has kept publishers and authors
delivering a steady stream of material
year after year after year.
It is nonetheless a brave author who
claims to offer something truly original
to our understanding of the war. Although some scholars may quibble over
whether or not Stoker has succeeded in
this effort, his Grand Design, a onevolume history that examines the role
of strategy in the Civil War, is something of a rara avis. More to the point,
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it is both a useful and thoughtprovoking addition to any library.
Surprisingly, Stoker is at his weakest
when discussing just what he means by
strategy. The term is admittedly somewhat slippery, and competing definitions abound. In the end, Stoker settles,
by his own admission, for examining
the linkage of political policy objectives
and subsequent military operations.
As a result, the two most important
personages in the book are Abraham
Lincoln and Jefferson Davis. As political
leaders of their respective sides, it was
they who were responsible for setting
and approving political policy and objectives. Lincoln emerges as a political
leader who, having once determined the
political objectives of the United States,
was forced time and again to intervene
in the running of the war because his
generals failed to gain those objectives
through military operations. In doing
so, Lincoln gradually gained a distinct
appreciation for the military art and
sharpened his ability to see clearly
which courses of action would likely
produce successful results. Davis, in
contrast, saw himself as the Confederacy’s general in chief and would persist
in that notion to the detriment of the
Confederate war effort until 1865.
Stoker naturally examines the military
men on the other side of the politicalmilitary equation. Perhaps no one
should have expected strategically gifted
senior officers to be found in the ranks
of the U.S. officer corps in 1860, and
Stoker confirms that such men were
then lacking, with the possible exception of the aged Winfield Scott. The
U.S. Army was small, its garrisons were
small, and with the exception of the
brief war with Mexico, its units had always been small. The only big things
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about the Army were its theater of operations and the egos of some of its
more famous personalities. Yet individuals with a broader expanse of vision
did emerge. The best of these wore
Union blue, and Stoker makes a convincing argument that the best of the
best was Ulysses S. Grant, a man notable in his ability to complement the
president’s policies and objectives with
effective military operations. Stoker argues that Grant’s success was not just a
question of superior resources. Grant
saw beyond his theater of operations.
He understood the tools available to
him, and he worked in harness with his
political leader. William T. Sherman is
also given credit for being a general in
strategic alignment with national policy
and objectives. In contrast, however,
Stoker reasonably judges George B.
McClellan as a general with strategic insight and imagination but woefully incompetent when it came to battlefield
leadership, without which strategic objectives cannot be realized.
Stoker is far from being an unabashed
fan of the Union’s strategists; his biggest censure on its generals’ performance is that they were slow. He
convincingly claims that a Union victory was possible much earlier than the
spring of 1865; however, he does not regard that victory as inevitable. In contrast, he faults Confederate counterparts with never getting it right at all.
His criticisms of Jefferson Davis’s fixation on forward defense and the waste
of trying to preserve and protect the
Confederacy west of the Mississippi are
well argued indeed. Stoker gives credit
to Robert E. Lee for his capability to be
as good as Grant but notes that he was
nearly always confined to theater operations. General P. G. T. Beauregard, a
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self-proclaimed Southern strategist, is
simply and reasonably dismissed as a
fantasist.
Given the number of bad books that
have been written about the Civil War,
it is a pleasure to find a good one.
Stoker is a solid, competent author who
makes his points in clear convincing
prose. Written from a refreshing viewpoint, The Grand Design is a book
worth reading.
RICHARD NORTON

Naval War College

McMeekin, Sean. The Berlin–Baghdad Express:
The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid for
World Power, 1898–1918. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard Univ. Press, 2010. 496pp. $29.95

If ever there was a story of epic unintended consequences and “might have
beens,” Sean McMeekin’s The Berlin–
Baghdad Express is it. Approaching the
First World War in the Middle East
from the German and Ottoman perspectives, McMeekin expands our
Anglo-centric understanding of the
conflict. In doing so, he unveils a
breathtaking catalogue of misunderstandings, miscalculations, simple mistakes, and missed opportunities that
would be comic if not so horribly
tragic.
While the title conjures images of the
fabled Orient Express, the book is a
first-rate history of the diplomatic jockeying of the German and Ottoman Empires to gain advantage over their
respective archrivals, Britain and Russia. The railway would be a tool to enable Germany’s Drang nach Osten
(drive to the East) while strengthening
the Turks (bitter enemies of Germany’s

Russian rivals) by linking the farthest
reaches of the Ottoman Empire with
the seat of power in Istanbul. The completion of the railway, first to Baghdad
and then extended on to Basra, would
have profound political, economic, and
strategic importance.
To achieve this end Germany designed
a strategy to undermine the cohesion of
the British Empire through Islamic holy
war. That strategy was an outgrowth of
Kaiser Wilhelm II’s reckless and amateurish meddling in Oriental affairs.
The kaiser believed that his affinity for
Sultan Abdulhamid II, Caliph of the
Faithful, and for all things Islamic
would enable him to engineer a jihad
against the hated British, targeting the
empire’s large Muslim populations in
India, Egypt, and beyond. The kaiser, in
league with the sultan and later the
Young Turks, embarked on ambitious
propaganda and military campaigns designed to rally Muslims to the sultan’s
call for jihad, despite the facts that most
educated Muslims had long given up
the idea of the caliphate; that there was
no distinction in Islamic jurisprudence
or practice between a bad infidel (British, French) and good one (German,
Austrian, American, or maybe Italian);
that Sunni and Shia Muslims had vastly
different views of jihad; and that the
British had for years controlled access
to Mecca for the hajj. McMeekin also
points out the oddness of German
support for jihad juxtaposed with the
German-based Zionist movement,
which actually anticipated Britain’s
Balfour Declaration to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine.
The cast of characters includes soldiers,
statesmen, adventurers, charlatans, humanitarians, and thugs from across Europe, the Caucasus, Africa, and the
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